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I. 
In this field questions arise which are certainly difficult; but as I 
listened last time to members of the group, I felt that the main difficul-
ty perhaps lay in determining precisely what questions we are trying to 
answer.  I have the conviction that if we could only say clearly what 
the questions are, the answers to them might not appear so elusive.  So 
I have begun with a simple list of questions about discretion which in 
one form or another were, as it seemed to me, expressed by the group 
last time.  I may indeed have omitted something and inserted some-
thing useless: if so, no doubt I shall be informed of this later. 
The central questions then seem to me to be the following: 
1. What is discretion, or what is the exercise of discretion? 
2. Under what conditions and why do we in fact accept or tolerate 
discretion in a legal system? 
3. Must we accept discretion or tolerate discretion, and if so, why? 
4. What values does the use of discretion menace, and what values 
does it maintain or promote? 
5. What can be done to maximize the beneficial operation of the 
use of discretion and to minimize any harm that it does? 
From this list I am certainly conscious of omitting some specific 
questions [from] last time.  For example, I have not included the psy-
chological question raised by Professor Freund: what are the psycho-
logical conditions of a sound use of discretion?  I have omitted this be- 
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cause I believe that if we clearly understand what it is to exercise a 
discretion and what in different fields counts as the satisfactory exer-
cise of a discretion, we shall not really have to face an independent 
psychological question of the form: what are the psychological condi-
tions of its sound exercise or how are we psychologically able to exer-
cise a discretion?  Indeed, I think this question, which looks on the 
surface to be one of empirical psychology, perhaps really expresses in a 
rather misleading form just our initial unclarity about what discretion 
is and what in various fields we count as a sound exercise of discre-
tion.  But only further exploration of our subject will show whether I 
am right in this, and I may very well not be right. 
II. 
I have headed my list with a question of definition and separated 
this from the other, more substantial-looking questions.  It might of 
course be the case that the term discretion is hopelessly vague and 
used by courts and juristic writers in an entirely haphazard fashion: if 
this were the case, the only observation which we could make about 
the meaning of the term discretion would be just this.  But it seems to 
me very unlikely that this is in fact the case: if it were the case, we 
must agree to discuss discretion without any expectation that we 
should in fact be talking about a common subject.  What is likely to be 
the case, as in all the major notions involved in the law, is that we can 
find a set of characteristics which are found together in the standard 
case of discretion: that is, in cases where everyone would agree that we 
have the phenomenon of discretion (e.g., rate-fixing by the ICC, the 
grant or refusal of specific performance by a court, the exercise of re-
prieve or pardon by the executive).  After the characteristics of the 
central or clear cases of the exercise of discretion have been distin-
guished, we can then see that there will be many other cases where on-
ly some of the cardinal features present in the clear case are present 
and where we would hesitate or disagree as to the classification of 
them as cases of discretion; there will also be present in cases which 
we would not normally classify as the exercise of discretion some fea-
tures of those present in the central cases.  This position, namely that 
we are able to distinguish the leading features of a clear case and then 
borderline cases where some but not all of the features are present, is 
characteristic, it seems to me, of definition in this field.  I prefer this 
way of putting the semantic situation to just saying that we have a 
continuum which stretches over a wide area and that we distinguish 
something which fades gradually into other notions because this meta-
phor of a continuum does not bring out the fact that we do, as well as 
recognize the vagueness at the boundary of such notions as discretion, 
also recognize clear or simple cases, and if we could not do this we 
should not be able to use the term in communication with each other.  
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But there are more important reasons for focusing attention on the 
characteristics present in those cases where we would all be agreed 
that they should be classified as cases of discretion: the first reason is 
that many difficulties or worries about discretion as expressed by 
members of the group certainly arise in the clear cases, and the fact 
that there are borderline cases which are doubtful or may be classified 
as discretion or not is irrelevant to many of these problems.  Secondly, 
we have in this case, as in similar cases where a definition may be 
profitable, the situation which really has stimulated philosophical in-
quiries ever since philosophy began: this is that while we are able to 
agree about a central area of phenomena as constituting clear cases of 
discretion, there coexists with this agreement on the use of the term or, 
if you like, with its mastery for the purposes of everyday life a funda-
mental unclarity about the principles which govern our agreed usage.  
The position is parallel to a person who knows his way about town by 
rote but could not draw a map of it or the crude case where we can 
say that I can recognize an elephant but I could not define the term 
“elephant” for you.  It seems to me to be vital to make explicit the 
characteristic features present in the agreed cases of discretion, and 
this can be done only by some kind of reflective analysis of our actual 
usage of that term. 
Very often of course the question “What is X?” and the question 
“For what purposes do we in fact use X?” must be considered together.  
This is obviously the case where the expression in question, X, like the 
word “knife,” turns out on investigation to refer to some instrument 
designed for some purpose.  In such cases what the thing is used for 
actually enters in to the meaning of the expression, but whether this is 
the case or not cannot be settled in advance of inquiring what the 
standard use of the term in question is.  Is it or is it not an instrumen-
tal term in the sense that the expression “a knife” is?  Lastly, some-
times when we investigate the meaning of some important expression 
we find that there is really no disagreement about what the expression 
means — everybody clearly understands it — and that what the dis-
pute is about is the way in which what the term stands for is used.  An 
example of this situation is, I think, discussion of what the State is; 
there is little disagreement that the State is in fact an organization of 
persons living on a territory under a certain type of legal system: the 
real dispute is more as to what form the State should take consistent 
with these primary features and what we want the State to [do] for us.  
In these cases I agree that the fundamental questions get misrepresent-
ed when posed as mere questions of definition.  But again, whether 
this is the situation or not can only be seen after we have undertaken 
to find out the minimum of agreed content in the normal usage of 
terms. 
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III. 
I list a set of examples of cases which would all clearly fall within 
the agreed ambit of the term “discretion.”  I have done this to remind 
ourselves of the tremendous diversity of the situations in which this 
phenomenon appears, for nothing in this field is so misleading as over-
concentration on one sort of example. 
A. Express or Avowed Use of Discretion 
1. By administrative bodies 
(a) Rate-fixing, e.g., railroad rates by ICC. 
(b) Licensing for carrying on a specific trade. 
(c) Control of potentially harmful activities, e.g., orders by 
Fish and Game Commissioners. 
(d) Appointment to offices in the public service. 
(e) Allocations of resources conceived to be at the disposal of 
government, e.g., allocations of public land by Land  
Department. 
(f) Management of public service or business undertaken by 
government, e.g., contracts for the construction of public 
works. 
2. By Courts 
(a) Application of standards by Courts 
(1) by Judge, e.g., “reasonable or proper cause” in mali-
cious prosecution. 
(2) by Jury under control of Judge, [e.g.,] “reasonable 
care” in negligent cases. 
(b) Discretionary remedies, e.g., injunction and specific  
performance. 
(c) Sentencing in criminal cases. 
B. Tacit or Concealed Discretion 
1. Interpretation of statutes. 
2. Use of precedent. 
C. Discretionary Interference or Dispensation from Acknowledged 
Rules 
1. A reprieve or pardon. 
2. Injunction against exercise of common law remedies. 
Two principles have guided me in the construction and division of 
this list of examples. 
A. I have taken examples which might suggest that the type of fac-
tor to which weight would be properly attached in the exercise 
of discretion will vary in different types of situations, e.g., there 
will be a difference in this respect between cases where a discre-
tion is exercised in order to make a distribution of a benefit or 
bounty (e.g., allocation of land or other resources at the disposal 
of the State) from cases where there is a discretionary interfer- 
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ence with what may be recognized [as a] prima facie right ([e.g.,] 
orders interfering with use of land or water threatening pollu-
tion or destruction of wild life). 
B. My main division is designed to emphasize the contrast between 
the cases where the sphere to be controlled is recognized ab ini-
tio as one demanding control by the exercise of discretion 
(Avowed Discretion) rather than by specific rules, even if it is 
hoped that rules will ultimately evolve in the course of the dis-
cretionary authority’s experience, and on the other hand cases 
where there is an initial attempt to regulate by specific rules but 
these are found in the course of actual application not to yield a 
unique answer in specific cases because combinations of circum-
stances arise in which the application of the rule is drawn in 
question and these combinations are outside the range of con-
crete applications considered at the time of the formulation of 
the rule.  This is the common choice of (1) disputable questions 
of interpretation of statutes or written rules and (2) disputable 
questions of what a precedent “amounts to” and whether or not 
a given case falls within the ambit of a precedent.  The resolu-
tion of these doubts calls for the exercise of discretion: but again 
the factors requiring attention in such exercises of discretion in 
the application of rules may prove to be different from those re-
quiring attention in the cases of Avowed Discretion conferred on 
bodies by statutes by the use of the typical words “reasonable,” 
“convenient,” “just,” “proper.” 
IV. 
What then is discretion?  In attempting to define or elucidate this 
term, we must for the moment avert our gaze from the Law because 
we shall find that the phenomenon of discretion which worries us in 
the Law has its roots and important place in our ordinary life and by 
the consideration of the relatively simple examples there we may be 
able to formulate clearly what are the characteristics present in the 
standard cases. 
I think that the first point which we learn from consideration of the 
use of the term outside the Law is that it would be mistaken to identi-
fy the notion of discretion with the notion of choice (tout court).  These 
are different though related notions.  It is worthwhile, I think, remem-
bering that discretion is after all the name of an intellectual virtue: it is 
a near-synonym for practical wisdom or sagacity or prudence; it is the 
power of discerning or distinguishing what in various fields is appro-
priate to be done and etymologically connected with the notion of dis-
cerning.  Hence we speak of years of discretion meaning not merely 
the age at which a human being is able to choose (because we can 
choose long before this) but merely the age when the judgment or  
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discernment to be exercised in choice is ripe.  A discreet person is not 
someone who just remains silent but who chooses to be silent when si-
lence is called for. 
The above suggests that there is one kind of choice which we 
should not rank as the exercise of discretion, namely those cases where 
in choosing we merely indulge our personal immediate whim or desire.  
Will you have a martini or a sherry?  You choose a martini, and I ask 
why: you reply, “Because I like it better — that’s all.”  Here, it seems 
to me, it would be absurd to talk of a discretion being exercised; the 
chooser accepts no principle as justifying his choice: he is not attempt-
ing to do something which he would represent as wise or sound or 
something giving effect to a principle deserving of rational approval 
and does not invite criticism of it by any such standards.  Of course, 
we might condemn his choice in many different ways: we might say, 
“You should have exercised some discretion and not just chosen what 
you felt like drinking.”  This would be to condemn or praise his choice 
by reference to prudential standards.  The drinker’s choice might ap-
proximate to something like the exercise of discretion if, in answer to 
the question “Why a martini,” he replied, “I have found from experi-
ence that I get on better when I drink that rather than sherry, I don’t 
talk so much,” etc.: here the choice is made by reference to some gen-
eral principle justifying it which affords some reason for calling it 
sound or wise, even if the scope of this principle is limited to the indi-
vidual conduct of his own life and does not purport to be of any great-
er generality.  So one case where choice and discretion seem to diverge 
is where the choice purports to be no more than the expression of per-
sonal whim, immediate desire, or liking.  This is one reason why I 
should say that if you vote for one or other candidates at an election, 
though this may in certain circumstances represent the exercise of dis-
cretion, it is not made so by the bare fact that the voter has a choice.  
A voter who votes for the candidate just because he likes him is choos-
ing, certainly, but is not exercising a discretion. 
What excuses but does not justify the premature identification  
of the notion of discretion and the notion of choice is, I think, the  
following: 
When we are considering the use of discretion in the Law we are 
considering its use by officials who are holding a responsible public of-
fice.  It is therefore understood that if what officials are to do is not 
rigidly determined by specific rules but a choice is left to them, they 
will choose responsibly having regard to their office and not indulge 
fancy or mere whim, though it may of course be that the system fails 
to provide a remedy if they do indulge their whim.  The position may 
perhaps be clarified by distinguishing between the following pair of 
expressions: (1) the expression “a discretion,” which means the authori-
ty to choose given on the understanding that the person so authorized 
will exercise discretion in his choice; and (2) the expression “discre-
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tion,” which means a certain kind of wisdom or deliberation guiding 
choice, the characteristics of which I shall try to bring out in what  
follows. 
Perhaps they may come to light if we consider some choices that 
are not exercises of discretion but for quite different reasons from the 
cases which we have so far considered.  These are choices where we do 
not indeed merely give effect to personal whim or desires of the mo-
ment but where we attempt to conform to principles and to defend our 
choices by them; yet because the principles are clear, determinate, 
highly specific, and uniquely determine the particular thing we have to 
do, we do not classify them as cases of discretion and it would be con-
fusing to do so.  Thus to take a simple example, suppose I am writing 
with a pencil, it breaks, and I want to sharpen it to a new point.  I go 
to the drawer and I am faced with a knife, three spoons, and two 
forks.  I choose a knife: if asked why, I would not here reply, “Because 
I like it,” but perhaps, “Because I want to sharpen a pencil and this is 
the obvious way to do it.”  Here it seems to me absurd to speak of a 
choice of a knife as an exercise of discretion: it was the only sensible 
thing to do, and when our aims are as determinate as this and the sit-
uation is as clear as this and the proper thing to do is patent to the el-
ementary knowledge of what will produce what, we choose indeed 
correctly but not in the exercise of discretion.  There is indeed no room 
for discretion in such a case.  Another case where there is no room for 
discretion and yet we are not really in our decisions or choices indulg-
ing private whim are cases such as the following.  “The Star Spangled 
Banner” is played: I stand up.  “Why did you stand up?”  I reply not 
indeed by saying, “Because I wanted to,” but I cite the established rule 
which quite unambiguously specifies what I am to do in this particular 
case.  Here I have done the correct thing: I have made the right choice, 
but it would be misleading to describe [it] as the exercise of a discre-
tion.  Notice that if we shift the example and imagine that I was 
weighing compliance with the rule against wider considerations and 
decided on the whole to obey the rule, this would approximate to a 
case where we would intelligibly speak of discretion.  So much de-
pends on a precise description of the choice with which the individual 
is faced. 
V. 
It seems to me then that discretion occupies an intermediate place 
between choices dictated by purely personal or momentary whim and 
those which are made to give effect to clear methods of reaching clear 
aims or to conform to rules whose application to the particular case is 
obvious.  The positive character of discretion may perhaps be brought 
out by contrasting with the examples so far taken the following case, 
where the leading characteristics of discretion seem to me to be present 
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in simple form.  A young hostess is giving her first dinner party and 
the question arises, shall she use for this occasion the best knives: they 
are old silver, very beautiful, and they will set off the snowy tablecloth 
and the glasses.  On the other hand, they are undoubtedly heavy and 
somewhat difficult to handle: they are not a bit sharp, and also their 
splendour might be thought a little bit showy by some.  What are in 
such a case the hostess’ controlling aims?  We can enumerate some 
without difficulty: a pretty dinner table, admiration, but also the com-
fort of the guests and perhaps that of an old distinguished judge with 
somewhat shaky hands who is going to the party.  So the hostess pon-
ders, she thinks out the possible disasters and some possible good con-
sequences from the courses before her: she balances one consideration 
against another and perhaps wonders whom she can consult.  She asks 
someone who has had a lot of experience in this field, an old lady, who 
says sagaciously that “on the whole I think the wisest thing to do 
would be to use the second-best set.”  She can give reasons for this 
such as the danger of discomforting old Mr. X. and his unfortunate 
behaviour when some small thing sets off his temper: she reminds the 
hostess of the possible jealousy of the younger guests, and so on. 
Now in this simple case it seems to me are the following features 
characteristic of discretion everywhere. 
A. There is not, as there was in the pencil-sharpening situation, a 
clear right or wrong.  Of the hostess’ situation we should say 
honest and sensible persons may take different views, and 
though there are arguments weighing in favour of one or other 
course, these are not conclusive though they have weight. 
B. There is not a clear definable aim, though we may use such 
general terms as “a successful dinner party” as an overall de-
scription of the various things at which the hostess is aiming.  
This however may be very deceptive: it may conceal from us 
that this stands for a general matrix susceptible of different 
types of filling, though of course it excludes quite definitely a 
number of determinate things such as the discomfort of the 
guests, ugly appearance of the table, and so on. 
C. The precise circumstances over which the decision will operate 
once it has been made are not known with any very great cer-
tainty, though the probable course of choices may to some ex-
tent be forecast.  Contrast the general high probabilities of what 
would happen if we used a knife to sharpen the pencil. 
D. Within the vaguely defined aim of a successful dinner party, 
there are distinguishable constituent values or elements (beauty 
of the table, comfort of the guests, etc.), but there are no clear 
principles or rules determining the relative importance of these 
constituent values or, where they conflict, how compromise 
should be made between them. 
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E. In this field, the hostess’ decisions or those of her advisor will 
not happily be called “right” or “wrong” with their sharp black 
or white connotations and refusal to admit degree: instead  
we would more felicitously use terms such as “wise,” “sound,” 
and perhaps deploy comparatives such as “wiser,” “sounder,” 
“better.” 
F. If the hostess’ decision is challenged there are two different 
ways in which a defense may characteristically be made of it. 
1. She would point out how her decision had been reached: 
that it had been preceded by as careful a consideration of the 
constituent elements in a successful dinner party as she 
could give; that she had attempted to work out what would 
happen on either course; that she had thought of similar cas-
es in her own experience and that she had obtained the ad-
vice of an experienced person.  To defend the choice along 
these lines is to appeal primarily to the manner in which the 
choice has been reached and the honest attempt to give ef-
fect to such controlling principles or values as applied to the 
case and to strike impartially some compromise between 
them where they conflicted.  This is to say that for choices of 
this kind we have a fairly definite idea of what are the opti-
mum conditions for reaching a sound decision though we do 
not have a clear idea of what the right or wrong choice is. 
2. To be distinguished from the defense of the choice by refer-
ence to the manner of its exercise, the hostess might well ap-
peal to the actual success of the dinner party. 
3. It is worth, I think, distinguishing these two lines of defense: 
we may refer to the first as justification and distinguish it 
from the second as vindication by results.  It seems to me 
plain that an exercise of a discretion may be justified even  
in cases where it is not vindicated by results.  We may how-
ever learn from a series of vindications certain new factors 
making for success to which we must also attend henceforth 
if our choices are to be justifiable.  There is a progressive 
evolutionary discovery of important and hence justifying 
factors. 
VI. 
Nearly every one of the factors which characterize the dinner party 
situation may be found in the legal literature concerning discretion in 
the Law.  Writers and courts considering the rate-fixing determinations 
of the ICC, for example, frequently use such expressions as, “[T]here is 
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no possibility of solving this question as though it were a mathematical 
problem to which there could only be one correct answer.”1  Other 
common phrases are, “The indefinite and often speculative character 
of the factors involved makes rate-fixing an exercise of discretion.”  
There is of course continual reference to the need for experts and an 
experienced board.  Sometimes the best that can be hoped for is said to 
be “a decision which reasonable men could have made on the evi-
dence.”  References are made to “an undefined sense of what is proper 
under given circumstances.”  It is sometimes said that the facts in such 
cases do not “compel a result” but there is need for “judgment.” 
These characteristic observations and also the features of the simple 
case discussed bring out that the distinguishing feature of the discretion 
case is that there remains a choice to be made by the person to whom the 
discretion is authorized which is not determined by principles which may 
be formulated beforehand, although the factors which we must take into 
account and conscientiously weigh may themselves be identifiable. 
VII. 
To go further we must now move to questions 2 and 3 and ask why 
in a legal system we do accept such a mode of decision as we have dis-
cussed and whether we must accept it.  To the question why, I think 
the short answer is: because we are men not gods, and as part of the 
human predicament we may find ourselves faced with situations 
where we have to choose what to do under two handicaps.  The first I 
will call Relative Ignorance of Fact, and the second I will call Relative 
Indeterminacy of Aim.  These two factors may face us in a given 
sphere alone or jointly: in any sphere in which we may want to regu-
late in advance by general principles or rules to be invoked in succes-
sive particular occasions as they arise, we find our capacity limited by 
them.  Sometimes the limitation imposed by the factors is so patent at 
the outset that we do not attempt to lay down specific rules but ab ini-
tio confer a discretionary jurisdiction on some official or authority: 
these are cases of Avowed Discretion.  In other spheres where these 
limitations are not so patent, we do attempt to lay down rules, and 
though we may proceed happily with them over a wide area, cases 
arise where in offense the rules break down and supply no unique an-
swer in a given case: this is the case of Tacit or Disguised Discretion. 
Let us consider now the first of these limiting factors: Relative Ig-
norance of Fact.  If the world in which we have to act and choose (1) 
consisted of a finite number of features or characteristics, (2) the modes 
in which these features could combine were limited to a finite number  
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of these modes, [and] (3) we knew both these features and modes of 
combination exhaustively, then we could always know in advance all 
the possible circumstances in which a question of the application of a 
rule would arise and we could therefore in framing our rule specify 
exhaustively in advance all the cases to which it was to apply and 
those to which it was not.  Then, to use Mr. Braucher’s expression, our 
labels would “clearly fit” the facts and not fit as we now feel loosely in 
many cases; but this would be the world of that mechanical Jurispru-
dence which we have long been taught is not our world.  Our world is 
indeed different: when we are bold enough to frame a rule of conduct 
(e.g., No vehicles are to be taken into the park), certain concrete appli-
cations of this rule are indeed present to our minds: these are the par-
adigm clear cases of the rule showing the motor car, the horse and 
cart, the motor bicycle, and the bus to be excluded without doubt by 
it.  But the totality of possible circumstances in which the application 
of the rule may be drawn in question so that we shall have to ask, “Is 
this a vehicle?” for the purposes of this rule are not confined to such 
clear cases.  We shall find that the cases where the application of the 
rule is suggested will not divide into the clear cases where the rule ap-
plies and on the other hand to clear cases where nothing of the sort 
envisaged by the rule is present in the park, only birds, flowers, and 
children.  On the contrary, there will be borderline cases which either 
we did not anticipate or could not anticipate: these will be the cases of 
skates, bicycles, perambulators, and toy motor cars, and faced with 
them we raise the characteristically mixed question, “Is this to be 
called a vehicle?”  Though some of those elusive cases could not have 
been anticipated or imagined in advance when they arise, we are 
forced to say that the rule either does or does not apply: such 
unprovided cases will certainly have some features in common with 
the clear standard cases and yet differ from them in respects which are 
relevant, where relevance is itself determined by many complex factors 
running through the legal system and depending on our aims in having 
a rule of this sort. 
So far I have considered the factor termed Relative Ignorance of 
Fact.  Consider now the second factor, Indeterminacy of Aim.  This 
factor is intertwined with the first factor, but there are cases certainly 
where the two may appear independently and separately.  Suppose my 
aim in having the rule excluding vehicles from the park was to make 
parks fit for people to rest and play in and walk freely about in with-
out the stringent attention to safety necessary in the streets.  Then it is 
true that this aim is so far determinate that we know that we have de-
cided to pursue it in what are the clear standard cases recognizable as 
application of the rule: that is to say, we know that we want peace in 
the park quoad the motorists, the bicyclists, the bus driver.  On the 
other hand, though we put this general aim of peace in the park in 
conjunction with those cases which we could not ab initio anticipate, 
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e.g., the scooter, the toy motor car electrically propelled (perhaps rather 
fast, moderately dangerous to the old, but great fun for the young), our 
aim is indeterminate in these directions: we have not settled whether 
some and if so what degree of peace in the park is to be sacrificed to 
those whose interest or pleasure it is to use these objects. 
When the actual case arises we then have to weigh and choose be-
tween or make some compromise between competing interests and 
thus render more determinate our initial aim.  In cases of this sort, the 
two factors limiting our power to regulate ab initio come together. 
Consider now cases where discretion is Express or Avowed, as 
when the courts apply a variable standard, e.g., the standard of due 
care in cases of civil negligence.  Very roughly speaking, the law is of 
course that a man has a right to compensation if his injuries, especially 
physical ones, are the result of the failure of another to take reasonable 
care to avoid inflicting such injuries.  But what is reasonable or due 
care in a concrete situation?  We can of course cite typical examples of 
due care: doing such things as stopping, looking, and listening where 
traffic is to be expected.  But we are all well aware that the situations 
where care is demanded are hugely various and that many other fac-
tors come in besides stop, look, and listen: indeed, these may not be 
enough and might be quite useless if looking would not help you to 
avert the danger or see anything.  What we are striving for in the ap-
plication of standards of reasonable care is (1) to insure that precau-
tions will be taken which will avert substantial harm, yet (2) that the 
precautions are such that the burden of proper precautions does not 
involve too great a sacrifice of other respectable interests.  Nothing 
very much is sacrificed by stopping, looking, and listening unless of 
course you are driving [a] man bleeding to death to the hospital.  But 
owing to the immense variety of possible cases where care is called for, 
we cannot ab initio foresee what combinations of circumstances will 
arise nor foresee precisely what interests will have to be sacrificed and 
how far if precaution against harm is to be taken.  Hence it is that we 
are unable to consider before particular cases arise precisely what sac-
rifice or compromise of interests or values we wish to make in order to 
reduce the risk of harm.  Again, our aim of securing people against 
harm is indeterminate til we put it in conjunction [with] or test it 
against possibilities which only experience will bring before us: when it 
does, then we have to face a decision which will, when made, render 
our aim pro tanto determinate. 
VIII. 
Administrative rate-fixing is of course a more dramatic illustration 
of the factors that make discretion inevitable in this human situation.  
We want a rate which is reasonable and fair, but this aim, like the aim 
of a successful dinner party, is [a] sort of grand matrix capable of in-
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definite number of different fillings or completions.  As usual there will 
be clear, identifiable examples of what is not a reasonable rate: a rate 
which would hold the public up to ransom for a vital service because 
it is so high would defeat any purpose that we could have in regulating 
rates; on the other side, perhaps more disputably, a rate too low to 
provide any possible incentive for running the railway organization or 
too low to provide returns higher than the occupation of sweeping the 
streets would normally have to be rejected.  But it is patent to anyone 
acquainted with this area of discretion that these are only some of the 
main constituents: successive cases reveal different factors requiring 
attention.  There may be rates which owing to the predicament of a 
local industry would jeopardize the prosperity of millions but apart 
from this consideration might well be thought fair.  This is only one of 
the complexities which preclude the satisfactory formulations of rules 
ex ante: and again the need for discretion springs from the attempt to 
regulate an area where the anticipatable combinations of relevant fact 
are relatively few and bring with them a relative indeterminacy of our 
aim.  Of course, we hope to evolve rules in the course of experience: 
this will turn upon the extent to which common factors running 
through diverse situations may be found, and in some cases they have 
been found and afford either a satisfactory basis for certain rules or re-
sult in the identification of a factor which will always require attention 
by the body exercising the discretion in these fields.  Of course, the 
ramparts of ICC determinations are strewn with the corpses of forlorn 
hopes for such rules (definitions of reasonable rates in terms of fair re-
turn on value in exchange, replacement value, investment value, etc.). 
Pending the evolution of rules, discretion must take its place be-
cause the area is really one where reasonable and honest men may dif-
fer, however well informed of the facts in particular cases. 
Hence, in such fields as these, the important matter, having diag-
nosed what it is that renders discretionary jurisdiction inevitable, is to 
identify what are the optimum conditions for the exercise of discretion, 
because where we cannot be sure of being right, we can at least do 
what we can to obtain the best conditions for decisions. 
I think it not too much to say that decisions involving discretion 
are rational primarily because of the manner in which they are made, 
but of course the word “manner” here must be understood to include 
not only narrowly procedural factors and the deliberate exclusion of 
private interest, prejudice, and the use of experience in the field but 
also the determined effort to identify what are the various values 
which have to be considered and subjected in the course of discretion 
to some form of compromise or subordination. 
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IX. 
The foregoing is of course merely a preliminary account and neces-
sarily far too general: what is now needed is to take the use of discre-
tion in various fields such as those perhaps illustrated by the examples 
in section III and to characterize what in each field are the factors 
which require our attention if discretion is to be soundly exercised.  I 
think that the optimum conditions for the exercise of discretion will 
prove to be very different in the case, say, where resort to discretion is 
had only tacitly or on the periphery of rules from other cases.  It seems 
to me clear, for example, that where discretion is used in the course of 
judicial determinations in the attempt to apply rules, the weight of fac-
tors such as consistency with other parts of the legal system will be 
prominent, whereas they may be at their minimum in cases of Avowed 
Discretion exercised by, say, a rate-fixing body. 
It is obvious that the interests of this group may be directed to dif-
ferent elements in the total phenomenon of discretion which I have 
tried to characterize: some members may think it of greatest im-
portance to identify and characterize the factors attention to which 
will be part of the sound exercise of discretion; others will be more in-
terested in the extent and scope of discretion to be entrusted to author-
ities in various different circumstances. 
I have myself concentrated attention in this admittedly introductory 
paper on the “leap” necessarily involved in the exercise of discretion af-
ter we have done all we can to secure the optimum conditions for its ex-
ercise.  This is important because phrases often used to describe the ex-
ercise of discretion, such as “intuition” [and] “recognition of an implicit 
guiding purpose,” may encourage the illusion that we never reach the 
point where we have to reconcile conflicting values or choose between 
them without some more ultimate principle to guide us.  I think the sug-
gestion that we never reach the “leap” is just as wrong as a description of 
discretion as a mere arbitrary choice would be.  It seems to me clear that 
just because there is a point at which we can no longer be guided by 
principles and at the best can only ask for the confirmation of our judg-
ment by persons who have submitted themselves to a similar discipline 
before deciding, that we have in discretion the sphere where arguments 
in favour of one decision or another may be rational without being con-
clusive.  No doubt we learn through successive exercises of discretion in 
a similar field and discovering what in the sense explained above ap-
pears to be vindicated to identify factors attention to which will be nec-
essary if further decisions are to be justified.  What would most merit 
examination in this field, I think, is the study of what standards we ap-
peal to when looking back upon a range of discretionary decisions we 
say typically such things as, “That was a satisfactory compromise be-
tween different values.”  Do we here appeal to the judgment of a plurality 
of impartial spectators, or are there more determinate principles at work? 
